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provide a more accurate measure of school performance or effectiveness, school rankings based on 
CVA are largely meaningless: almost half of English secondary schools are indistinguishable from the 
national average. 
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The English education system has incorporated elements of parental choice for twenty 
years, and the 2006 Education and Inspections Bill aims to extend and strengthen the 
role of choice as a driver for improving educational outcomes. For choice to create the 
incentives  for  schools  to  improve  their  performance  two  conditions  need  to  be 
satisfied (Rothstein 2006). First, school effectiveness needs to be at least a substantial 
determinant of parental choice; second, parents need to be able to distinguish effective 
from  ineffective  schools.  In  England  parental  choice  is  informed  by  in-depth 
inspection  reports  on  individual  schools  and  by  the  annually  published  school 
performance or league tables. This paper investigates the extent to which the current 
English secondary school league tables provide the information necessary to support 
parental choice on the basis of school effectiveness. 
 
The 2006 league tables included two new performance measures (PMs) for the first 
time. Alongside the original target indicator of the proportion of a school’s pupils 
gaining at least five passes at GCSE at grade C or above (5AC), there is now an 
indicator which distinguishes the sub-group whose five good passes include English 
and maths (5AC:EM)
1. Also a new measure of contextual value added (CVA) has 
replaced the value added (VA) PMs which have been included in the league tables 
since  2002.  These  new  indicators  have  been  introduced  partly  in  response  to  the 
shortcomings of previous PMs.  
 
Since they were first published in 1992, 5AC has been the key PM in the English 
secondary school league tables. This is a summary measure of test score outcomes, 
combining  information  on  a  school’s  effectiveness  with  information  on  the 
composition  of  its  intake.  All  other  things  being  equal,  a  high  ability  intake  will 
provide a high level output score, regardless of the effectiveness of the schooling 
provided. This creates potentially perverse incentives for schools who aim to achieve 
a  high  ranking  in  the  league  tables  derived  from  this  PM.  These  include  various 
creaming strategies, both with regard to selection of pupils (Meyer 1997; West and 
Pennell  2000)  and  with  regard  to  selective  entry  of  different  types  of  pupils  into 
certain types of tests (Figlio and Getzler 2002; Cullen and Reback 2006; Wilson et al 
2006). The specific ‘target’ nature of the 5AC measure may also create the incentive 
for schools to focus resources at those pupils on the borderline between grades D and 
C, possibly to the detriment of other pupils in the school (Deere and Strayer 2001; 
Burgess et al 2005; Wilson et al 2006). More generally, a ranking exercise based on 
raw  test  scores  will  favour  schools  with  a  higher  ability  composition.  Given  the 
known link between socio-economic status and attainment, this also has the potential 
to  “demonise”  schools  in  poor  neighbourhoods  while  saying  nothing  about  their 
effectiveness (Raey and Lucey 2003). The 5AC:EM performance measure addresses 
at least one potential gaming strategy as it prevents schools from entering borderline 
pupils from more vocational exams (GNVQs, worth four good GCSE passes) in order 
to boost the indicator (Wilson et al 2006). 
 
Value added (VA) performance measures were introduced in 2002. They take account 
of pupils’ prior attainment, and so provide a measure of a school’s impact on the 
progress of a pupil cohort between two points in time. Value added PMs therefore 
provide a more accurate measure of school effectiveness (Propper and Wilson 2003; 
Wilson 2004); they should also reduce the incentive for creaming strategies, as the 3 
different abilities of a school’s intake are explicitly taken into account. It is not clear, 
however, whether VA PMs impact on parents’ choice of school (and hence on the 
incentives faced by schools). Certainly a sample of secondary school headteachers 
expected  5AC  to  still  be  the  ‘headline’  figure  and  for  them  to  therefore  have  to 
continue to focus on that indicator (Wilson et al 2006). This is relevant given that the 
two  indicators  lead  to  different  rankings  across  schools  (Wilson  2004;  Goldstein 
2001). The VA PM does not fully separate effectiveness from composition, however. 
While  prior  attainment  is  the  most  important  predictor  for  future  performance 
(Thomas 1998), other factors outside the school’s control also impact on pupil results. 
These include gender, deprivation and high levels of pupil mobility (Yang et al 1999). 
Further criticisms of VA PMs include, first, the extent to which they hide evidence of 
differential effectiveness, i.e. differences in performance by any one school for its 
pupils of different abilities, which may limit its usefulness to any one parent trying to 
choose a school for their particular child (Thomas 2001; Wilson 2004). Second, the 
extent to which, in practice, meaningful comparison across schools according to their 
VA may be somewhat limited due to the extent to which their confidence intervals 
overlap (Goldstein 2001). Finally, there is evidence that VA is not as stable across 
years as PMs based on raw test scores (Kane and Staiger 2002; Gray et al 2001), 
which again may limit its usefulness as a means of evaluating and comparing school 
performance.  
 
The  introduction  of  contextual  value  added  (CVA)  can  be  seen  as  an  attempt  to 
further  separate  effectiveness  from  composition  and  so  provide  a  more  accurate 
measure of the actual impact of a school on pupil progress. CVA explicitly takes 
account of various factors that are independent of schools but which are known to 
impact on educational outcomes, both at the pupil and the school level, including 
gender,  deprivation  and  peer  group.  We  discuss  how  it  is  constructed  below  and 
assess how the published school average CVA performs with regard to the criticisms 
levelled at its VA predecessor. 
 
The evolution of PMs in the English school performance tables can therefore be seen 
as a move to better reflect school effectiveness, which is supportive of the government 
aim of improving outcomes or standards. What is less clear is the extent to which the 
new  measures  are  able  to  provide  meaningful  comparisons  of  individual  schools’ 
effectiveness, and thus provide the more accurate information necessary to support 
parental choice as an effective driver for such improvements.  
 
In this paper we use UK government administrative data to replicate the key PMs and 
resultant school rankings for English state secondary schools to provide evidence on 
two  issues.  First,  we  consider  the  extent  to  which  CVA  does  isolate  school 
effectiveness from composition. To do this we explore differences between the 5AC, 
5AC:EM and CVA rankings, and investigate how CVA depends on different school 
characteristics. Second, we address the extent to which CVA itself informs parents 
about  the  relative  performance  (effectiveness)  of  secondary  schools.  We  first 
investigate whether the published school average CVA hides differences in a school’s 
effectiveness across pupils of different abilities, and then explore the extent to which a 
ranking exercise based on CVA is meaningful. Here we consider both the degree to 
which schools can be meaningfully ranked in any one  year, and how stable these 





The general aim of a value added PM is to isolate the impact made by a school on the 
progress of a cohort of pupils between two points in time. In practice, in England, this 
means progress between successive Key Stages of the National Curriculum
2. There 
are  various  ways  in  which  value  added  can  be  calculated  (Wilson  2004).  The 
Department for Children, Schools and Families (DCSF; until recently the Department 
for Education and Skills (DfES)) uses a national ‘median line’ approach (DfES 2005): 
the value added for each individual pupil is the difference between her own output 
point  score  and  the  median  (middle)  output  point  score  achieved  by  others  with 
similar input point scores (prior attainment). So, for example, a measure of the value 
added by secondary schools takes Key Stage (KS) 2 scores as the input (taken at age 
11 just prior to entry into secondary school) and KS4 (or GCSE, taken at the end of 
compulsory schooling at age 16) as the output. 
 
The principal remains the same when calculating contextual value added, although 
now each pupil is compared to peers who not only have similar input point scores but 
who are also similar across a range of other contextual factors which are known to 
impact  on  educational  attainment.  A  prediction  is  made  for  each  pupil  based  on 
nationally observed patterns, and her CVA score is then the difference – positive or 
negative – from this prediction. The pupil-level CVA model is able to isolate the 
impact  of  each  of  these  contextual  factors,  and  shows  how  well  each  pupil  is 
performing  relative  to  similar  pupils  in  her  national  cohort.  The  pupil  level  CVA 
scores are aggregated to give a school level CVA PM. In the secondary school league 
tables there is a CVA measure for each school measuring pupil progress between KS2 
and KS4. 
 
So what are the contextual factors included in the DCSF calculation? In addition to 
prior attainment (here, KS2), the model includes the following pupil characteristics: 
 
·  gender, 
·  special educational needs status, 
·  eligibility for free school meals (a proxy for low income), 
·  ethnicity, 
·  English as an additional language, 
·  mobility (movement into schools at non-standard transfer times), 
·  within-year age, 
·  whether the pupil has been ‘in care’ while at school, 
·  IDACI measure of deprivation of the pupil’s home neighbourhood
3. 
 
The model also includes two school level attainment variables: the average KS2 score 
of the pupil’s cohort and a measure of its spread (standard deviation), which try to 
take account of the impact of a pupil’s peer group on her progress through school. 
This reflects the body of evidence that peer group matters for individual attainment 
(see  Tough  and  Brooks  (2007)  for  a  recent  review).  The  DCSF  model  does  not 
capture all the factors which have an impact on pupil attainment, however. There is 
evidence, for example, that better predictions are obtained if account is taken of pupil 
performance  prior  to  KS2  tests  (Goldstein  and  Sammons  1997).  Because  the 
contextual factors that are included in the model are measured at two levels, pupil and 5 
school, the appropriate statistical technique employed to calculate CVA is multi-level 
modelling  (MLM)  (Aitkin  and  Longford  1986;  Snijders  and  Bosker  1999; 
Raudenbush and Bryk 2002; Goldstein 2003). 
 
We  replicate  the  DCSF  methodology  using  government  administrative  data. 
Specifically  we  use  data  from  the  PLASC/NPD  dataset.  The  Pupil  Level  Annual 
Schools  Census  (PLASC),  part  of  the  National  Pupil  Database  (NPD)  is  an 
administrative dataset collected by the DCSF. As it is a Census it contains information 
on all pupils in state schools in England. PLASC comprises information on pupil 
characteristics such as those listed above, which can be linked to each pupil’s test 
score history, all of which are contained in the NPD (Barker 2006). We consider three 
cohorts of pupils. We primarily report results from the cohort who took their GCSE 
(KS4) exams in 2004, their KS3 tests in 2002 and KS2 tests in 1999. We repeat the 
analysis  for  the  2005  and  2006  cohorts  (results  available  on  request  where  not 
reported in the paper). We use pupils attending mainstream schools for which we have 
a full set of individual characteristics and home postcode (required to match in the 




Table 1 shows the coefficients we derive from a two-level (secondary school and 
pupil) multilevel model for our 2004 cohort. We also report some descriptive statistics 
of  the  estimation  sample.  The  model  enables  us  to  predict  the  total  GSCE  score 
(capped at the best eight GCSE grades as in the DCSF calculation) for an individual 
pupil with any set of characteristics. For example, as expected, the higher the average 
KS2 score of a pupil, the higher her predicted GCSE score
5. A pupil eligible for free 
school  meals  has  a  predicted  GCSE  score  that  is  lower  by  20  GCSE  points  (the 
difference  between  a  grade  A  and  a  grade  C,  for  example)  than  an  otherwise 
equivalent non-FSM pupil. If she lives in a deprived neighbourhood as measured by 
the IDACI coefficient she is further disadvantaged. Girls perform better than boys by 
16.4 GCSE points, and minority ethnic groups generally perform better than their 
white peers
6. Pupils with unusual school mobility, i.e. those who transfer between 
schools at non-standard times, appear to be at a large disadvantage (we return to this 
result later). Finally, there appears to be an advantage in attending schools with a 
higher ability cohort (higher average KS2 score), and with a peer group of similar 
ability, as shown by a negative coefficient on the KS2 standard deviation variable. 
 
Using this model we can derive a predicted GCSE score for each pupil with a specific 
set of characteristics. This is then compared to the actual GCSE score of each pupil 
with those characteristics, and the CVA for that pupil is the difference – positive or 
negative  –  between  the  two.  The  CVA  PM  for  each  school  is  then  calculated  by 
averaging across the individual CVA scores of all pupils in the relevant school cohort. 
This school-level average is then multiplied by a shrinkage factor, which depends on 
the number of pupils in a school’s cohort and which brings the school residuals (CVA 
scores) of smaller schools closer to the national average
7. Finally, 95% confidence 
intervals are calculated for each school’s CVA measure. This is to take account of the 
uncertainty involved in using a set of test results, achieved by one set of pupils on one 
day, as a measure of the underlying effectiveness of the school. The school’s CVA 
represents its departure – positive or negative – from the national average (zero) that 
is the prediction given by the fixed parameters derived from the model and described 
in Table 1. Two points to note here. First, schools for which the 95% confidence 6 
interval does not include zero have a performance that is significantly different at the 
5%  level  to  the  national  average
8.  Second,  the  standard  95%  confidence  intervals 
calculated  from  the  model  –  and  those  published  in  the  government’s  school 
performance tables – enable statistically meaningful comparisons to be made between 
individual  schools’  performance  and  the  overall  national  average,  but  not  directly 
between the performance of pairs (or more) of schools. We return to both these points 
below. 
 
We construct school-level CVA measures for state maintained secondary schools in 
England. Following the DCSF methodology we estimate the model on mainstream 
(non-special) schools only. We also delete middle schools (see endnote 2) and schools 
that have particularly high pupil mobility, which led to them having highly biased 
estimates (we return to this issue below; see also Goldstein et al (2006)). We omit 
schools  with  less  than  20  pupils  in  the  cohort,  for  whom  we  have  full  data  as 
described  above,  due  to  the  statistical  uncertainty  in  CVA  and  other  performance 
measures for such small cohorts. Our 2004 analysis sample contains 2,940 schools.  
 
For  each  school  in  our  sample  we  also  construct  the  two  key  published  target 
indicators: the percentage of pupils gaining at least 5 GCSE passes or equivalent at 
grade C or above (5AC) and the percentage of pupils gaining the same number of 
good  passes  including  English  and  Maths  (5AC:EM).  We  then  calculate  school 





1  The  extent  to  which  CVA  isolates  school  effectiveness  from  school 
composition 
 
(a) Comparing PMs and the resultant rankings 
 
First we consider both the relationships between the alternative performance measures 
published for each secondary school and between the resultant rankings. Tables 2a 
and 2b show the correlations between the PMs and the rankings respectively
9. As 
expected, there is a high correlation between the two PMs based on raw GCSE scores. 
It is interesting to consider the relationship between 5AC and 5AC:EM in more detail. 
Figure 1 plots these two performance measures for each school. While the overall 
correlation coefficient is high at 0.93, virtually all schools lie below the 45 degree 
line, showing that it is easier to hit the target which has no restrictions regarding the 
subjects that can be included. For some schools the discrepancy between the two 
measures is quite pronounced: it is possible for a school’s score to drop from over 
90% of pupils hitting the target to around 30% doing so, once the English and maths 
requirement is included. This suggests that some schools may indeed have been using 
the GNVQ strategy discussed above to boost their 5AC performance measure. 
 
Referring  again  to  Tables  2a  and  2b,  the  correlation  between  either  of  the  target 
indicators and CVA is much lower, which suggests that ranking schools on the basis 
of these different PMs would yield different, and conflicting, results. This is further 
illustrated in Figure 2. Here we plot school rankings based on CVA  against their 
ranking on the 5AC measure. Each triangle represents a secondary school. Schools are 7 
lower in the rankings the further they are from the origin. The figure shows that there 
is very little relationship between the two: it is possible to be ranked high on CVA and 
low  on  5AC  and  vice  versa.  The  5AC  measure  incorporates  information  on  both 
school composition and effectiveness. By attempting to isolate the latter, the CVA PM 
produces very different rankings. 
 
(b) Relationship between rankings and school characteristics 
 
Here we explore further the extent to which CVA produces different rankings from 
5AC for different school types
10,11. In Figure 3 we categorise schools according to the 
percentage of their pupils who are from low income households, defined by their 
eligibility for free school meals (FSM). In general terms, schools in high income areas 
have outperformed those in low income areas, according to the 5AC measure. Here, 
we see if this is still the case with CVA, which controls for the (low) income of a 
school’s intake. We distinguish three sections of the FSM distribution across schools: 
low,  medium  and  high  (which  correspond  to  schools  in  the  lower  quartile,  inter-
quartile range and upper quartile of the distribution respectively). Again we plot CVA 
versus 5AC rankings for each school, with the lower ranked schools further from the 
origin. The majority of low-FSM schools are above the 45 degree line drawn on the 
figure, which shows that low-FSM schools will be ranked higher on 5AC than on the 
CVA PM, with the reverse being true for high-FSM schools. By taking account of the 
link between low income and low attainment, the CVA measure enables schools with 
a high proportion of FSM pupils to achieve a higher ranking, other things being equal. 
Similar pictures are obtained when we categorise schools according to the average 
deprivation of their pupils’ home neighbourhoods (see endnote 3), and according to 
the proportion of their pupils with special educational needs.  
 
Figure  4  again  plots  CVA  versus  5AC  rankings  for  each  school,  this  time 
distinguishing  schools  according  to  their  admissions  policy:  comprehensive, 
academically  selective  (i.e.  grammar  schools),  secondary  modern.  One  enduring 
feature  of  the  5AC  league  tables  is  how  well  grammar  schools  perform  and  how 
highly they are ranked. Here we see if this is still the case when the PM controls for 
school composition. In Figure 4, schools are again lower in the rankings the further 
they are from the origin. The striking feature is the grouping of grammar schools – 
schools that explicitly select pupils by ability – at the left hand side of the figure: 
grammar schools all rank very highly on the 5AC measure, but once key features of 
their intake is taken into account, there is much more variation in their performance. 
This  highlights  one  reason  for  the  introduction  of  the  CVA  PM:  performance 
measures based on raw output ‘flatter’ schools with a high ability intake which, by 
definition, include grammar schools. We get a very similar picture when we look at 
single-sex versus co-educational schools due to the fact that the majority of single-sex 
schools are selective. 
 
There are, however, two indicators included in the CVA model that might create a 
misleading picture of schools’ relative performance. These are the mobility indicators: 
‘Pupil joined school after September in Year 10’ and ‘Pupil did not join school in 
July/August/September in Years 7, 8 and 9’
12. The inclusion of indicators for pupils 
who  transfer  between  schools  at  non-standard  times  reflects  evidence  that  this 
increased mobility has  a negative impact on these pupils’ attainment. This should 
therefore be factored out of any measure attempting to isolate school effectiveness. 8 
The particularly low attainment of the children of travellers provides one example of 
this (Ofsted 2003; Equalities Review 2007). Because the CVA measure takes this into 
account,  schools  with  high  proportions  of  ‘mobile’  children  will,  all  other  things 
equal, be ranked higher on this measure than on the traditional VA or raw output 
measures. This may create an anomaly in the case of newly-opened schools if they 
admit large numbers of pupils at non-standard times. If these pupils do not have the 
lower  attainment  associated  with  ‘traditionally  mobile’  pupils,  the  school’s  CVA 
measure will be upward biased and their performance will be artificially high. This is 
particularly relevant in the current English system, where some so-called ‘failing’ 
schools are being replaced by/re-opened as new schools
13. 
 
The key question is whether late-joining pupils in ‘high-mobility’ schools (such as 
those that are newly opened) are in fact similar in terms of attainment to late-joining 
pupils in other schools. The lower attainment  of the latter group is accounted for 
within the CVA model. If, however, the attainment of the former is in fact not lower 
on average, the estimates of CVA for these ‘high-mobility’ schools will be upward 
biased. 
 
To test whether late joining pupils in ‘high-mobility’ schools experience the same 
disadvantage as other late joining pupils, we rerun the CVA model and allow for the 
interaction  of  the  ‘high-mobility’  school  indicator  with  the  pupil  level  mobility 
indicators. We find that late joiners in average schools are more disadvantaged than 
late  joiners  in  ‘high-mobility’  schools.  For  example,  the  disadvantage  of  joining 
school after September in Year 10 for an average school is 68.61 GCSE points (two 
passes  at  grade  D),  while  it  is  only  4.09  and  not  significant  for  a  high-mobility 
school
14. The two types of ‘mobile’ pupil are not the same, and hence the CVA league 
tables may therefore overestimate the performance of ‘high-mobility’ schools simply 
due to this anomaly. This may be a particular issue when comparing the performance 
of new schools with more established schools.  
 
We investigate this by comparing the CVA performance of newly opened schools in 
the year in which they open to that in the subsequent years. The question we are 
asking is whether their CVA is upward biased due to the anomalous high mobility in 
their year of opening. We find evidence of such an upward bias: all but one of the 
newly-opened schools in our sample experience a significant drop in their CVA in 
their second year of existence, with new schools from 2004 maintaining this lower 
level of performance in the third year
15. While this evidence is suggestive rather than 
conclusive, it implies that caution may be required in evaluating the performance of 
new schools in terms of their CVA. 
 
 
2 The extent to which CVA informs parents about the relative effectiveness of 
schools 
 
(a) Does school-level CVA hide evidence of differential effectiveness? 
 
We investigate the extent to which schools are differentially effective with respect to 
the  CVA  measure  across  pupils  of  different  ability,  to  see  how  informative  the 
published school average measure is for individual parents. As a proxy for ability we 
use a pupil’s average Key Stage 2 (KS2) score (average across English, maths and 9 
science, taken in the final year of primary school at age 11). We split the national KS2 
distribution  into  three  parts:  the  top  25%  (‘high  ability’),  the  bottom  25%  (‘low 
ability’) and the middle 50% (‘medium ability’) and allow schools’ CVA performance 
to vary among their pupils according to their positions in this KS2 distribution
16. In 
Table 3 we report the correlations between schools’ performance for different ability 
pupils. We find some evidence of differential effectiveness across pupils of different 
abilities. Correlations between schools’ performance for different ability groups are as 
follows: 0.85 between low and medium ability, 0.86 between high and medium ability 
and 0.61 between low and high ability. These results concur with previous evidence 
(Thomas et al 1997; Goldstein and Thomas 1996) and show that the published school 
average CVA does hide evidence of schools’ differential effectiveness for pupils of 
different abilities. 
 
(b) How stable are CVA performance measures over time? 
 
In Table 4 we investigate the proportions of schools that exhibit large swings in their 
CVA  performance  from  year  to  year,  according  to  the  following  categories: 
significantly  negative,  average  and  significantly  positive.  Significantly  negative 
(positive) means the CVA and confidence interval lie wholly below (above) the zero 
line. Two points to note from this table are that approximately 60% of schools stay in 
the same category across years (figures along the main diagonals), and that there are 
only small numbers of schools switching from significantly positive to significantly 
negative or vice versa (highlighted in bold italics; see also Thomas et al (2007))
17. 
This suggests a high degree of stability. 
 
Consider now, however, Tables 5a and 5b, in which we report the correlations across 
the three  years for which we have data, both for CVA and the resultant rankings 
respectively. At around 0.7 for successive years, and 0.6 across the two-year gap, 
these summary figures suggest a lower, and decreasing, degree of stability over time 
(compared to around 0.9 and 0.87 for 5AC). A key point here is the inevitable time-
lag  involved  in  using  such  performance  measures  for  parental  choice  (Gray  et  al 
2001). The most recent published information available to parents choosing between 
secondary schools is based on the school’s performance for the cohort of pupils who 
entered the school six years previously. Our results suggest that this lack of stability 
over time may limit the extent to which current CVA PMs can be used to predict 
future  performance,  and  hence  limit  the  usefulness  of  CVA  to  parents  choosing 
between schools. 
 
(c) To what extent can schools be ranked according to CVA? 
 
In Figure 5 we plot the 2004 CVA PM and its confidence interval for each secondary 
school. We rank schools from high to low CVA across our sample
18. The scale on the 
y axis is in GCSE points
19. A CVA value of zero means that, on average, the school 
performs as expected for its pupils, given their characteristics. The zero line on the 
graph therefore represents the national average level of CVA. The figure shows that 
the confidence intervals of a large proportion of the schools cross the zero line. It is 
only possible to state that a school’s CVA is significantly better (worse) than the 
national average if they have a score above (below) zero and a confidence interval 
that  does  not  include  zero.  Only  51.8%  of  secondary  schools  in  England  can  be 
judged  to  be  significantly  different  from  average  according  to  the  CVA  measure 10 
(25.7% better and 26.1% worse). In other words, 48.2% of secondary schools cannot 
be judged to be significantly different from the national average. We obtain extremely 
similar results for our 2005 and 2006 cohorts.  
 
In general, however, the focus is not on comparing a school’s performance with the 
national average. School performance tables are published with a view to help parents 
compare the performance of pairs or groups of schools, across a Local Authority or 
other geographical area, for example, in order to inform parental choice. Crucially, the 
confidence intervals illustrated in Figure 5 – which replicate those published by the 
government – only enable comparison with the national average; they do not enable 
meaningful pairwise comparison of schools. The correct confidence intervals (referred 
to as overlap intervals) which enable such pairwise comparisons can be constructed, 
however, and, under certain assumptions, can be adjusted to account for comparison 
between more than two schools (Goldstein & Healey 1995; Goldstein 2005; Goldstein 
and Thomas 1996).  
 
We calculate such pairwise 95% confidence intervals and plot these with school CVA 
in Figure 6. The performance of any two schools is significantly different from one 
another if their confidence intervals do not overlap. From this figure we see that the 
majority of pairwise comparisons of schools will not be meaningful. Any ranking 
exercise  across  groups  of  schools  that  is  based  on  their  CVA  scores  alone  may 




A contextual value added performance measure was published for the first time in the 
2006 English secondary school league tables. By accounting for factors which impact 
on pupils’ attainment, but which are outside the control of the school, the aim of CVA 
is to provide a more accurate measure of school effectiveness, i.e. the impact of a 
school on the progress of its pupils. What is less clear is the extent to which schools 
can  be  meaningfully  ranked  according  to  CVA,  and  hence  the  extent  to  which  it 
facilitates parental choice along this dimension. This paper provides evidence on both 
these questions.  
 
Overall,  school-level  CVA  is  a  more  accurate  performance  measure  than  its 
predecessors. It better isolates school effectiveness from composition, and so provides 
a  better  measure  of  the  actual  impact  of  a  school  on  the  progress  of  its  pupils 
(although we have identified a problem regarding the mobility indicator in the case of 
newly-opened  schools).  The  underlying  pupil-level  methodology  from  which  it  is 
constructed additionally provides information which is being used within schools as 
an  internal  performance  management  tool
20.  There  is  evidence  of  differential 
effectiveness, and a question mark over its stability over time, however, both of which 
reduce its usefulness as a tool for parental choice.  
 
But our analysis highlights further major problems with the current use of CVA to 
rank and compare individual schools. Given that almost half the schools cannot be 
statistically distinguished from the national average, any ranking exercise based on 
these numbers will be largely spurious. This tendency will increase when the number 
of pupils within schools is small, and the resulting confidence intervals large. This 
casts  doubt  on  the  usefulness  of  the  UK  government’s  introduction  of  CVA  for 11 
primary schools from 2007, given that their average cohort size is approximately one 
quarter that of secondary schools. 
 
Moreover, the confidence intervals published by the government (but, interestingly, 
not generally reproduced by the print media) in the 2006 school performance tables 
do not enable pairwise  or group  comparison between schools. Even if  the correct 
confidence intervals were published, our analysis shows that the performance of most 
schools  cannot  be  meaningfully  distinguished  from  that  of  other  schools,  again 
showing the largely spurious nature of any subsequent ranking exercise.  
 
A  question  for  policy  that  arises  from  this  analysis,  therefore,  is  (how)  can  the 
performance information contained within the CVA measure be used as part of  a 
broader performance management regime for schools? Our analysis suggests some 
form of categorisation of schools, relative to the national average CVA. Consider 
again  Figure  5.  Schools  could  be  categorised  as  having  significantly  positive 
performance (CVA and confidence interval wholly above the zero line); significantly 
negative  performance  (below  the  zero  line)  and  average  performance  (confidence 
interval crossing the zero line). Such a categorisation is indeed possible, but can only 
be used in absolute and not relative or comparative terms. This is because it is not 
possible to compare either positively or negatively performing schools with those in 
the  average  category  due  to  the  larger  confidence  intervals  –  and  hence  higher 
likelihood of being categorised as ‘average’ – associated with smaller schools. Such 
an absolute categorisation would enable schools at the extremes of the distribution to 
be identified, however (Goldstein 1997; 2001), which could provide a starting point 
for a dialogue in which schools have to account for their performance. Contrary to 
being  part  of  a  parental  choice  agenda,  this  accords  more  with  the  notion  of  a 
‘performance intelligence’ approach to performance management, whereby ranking 
positions provide the basis for dialogue between provider and policy maker, rather 
than being explicitly linked to specific targets or penalties
21.  
 
Providing accurate information on school performance (effectiveness) is a necessary, 
but not sufficient, condition for facilitating parental choice along that dimension, and 
hence  for  creating  an  effective  driver  for  real  improvement.  A  broader  question, 
outside the scope of this paper, is the extent to which parents actually choose schools 
on the basis of effectiveness, rather than with consideration of other aspects of the 
school such as location, ethos, or the composition of the student body. On the basis of 
the evidence presented here, however, it seems that much work is needed to produce 
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1 GCSE exams are taken at the end of compulsory schooling in England, at age 16. 
2 All pupils in English state schools follow the National Curriculum, which comprises four Key Stages. 
They take Key Stage (KS) tests in primary school at ages 7 and 11 (KS1 and KS2). At age 11 they 
move to secondary school and take KS3 tests at age 14 and KS4 (GCSE) at age 16. A small number of 
schools (‘middle schools’) don’t follow this pattern of transfer between primary and secondary school 
at the age of 11. We omit middle schools from our analysis sample. 
3 Income Deprivation Affecting Children Index (IDACI) measures the proportion of children under the 
age of 16 in an area living in low income households. IDACI is measured at Lower Layer Super Output 
Area (LLSOA). A lookup table of LLSOA to IDACI can be obtained from 
http://www.communities.gov.uk/odpm/SOA/IDACandIDAOP2004.xls . 
4 There are a few unavoidable differences between our data and those used in the DCSF CVA 
calculations. Due to confidentiality issues we were not able to obtain the ‘in care’ variable, nor each 
pupil’s full date of birth (we have month within year). Also our ethnicity categorisation is less detailed: 
we do not have indicators for Irish, traveller of Irish heritage, Gypsy Roma or any other white 
background ethnicities. 
5 Return to KS2 is [-2.92*KS2] + [0.33*(KS2)
2], which is positive overall.  
6 Wilson et al (2005) provide a detailed analysis of the relative progress of pupils of different 
ethnicities through both primary and secondary schooling. 
7 Schools with smaller numbers of pupils have a much higher chance of having an outlying residual by 
chance alone; the shrinkage factor takes account of this.  
8 In practice the published CVA PMs are centred around 1000, presumably to avoid publishing 
negative CVAs. In this paper we centre the PMs around zero.  
9 As CVA allows for uncertainty around the mean school residual and the true school residual can lie 
anywhere along this uncertainty interval, we use the mean residual for ranking purposes. 
10 We have also carried out this exercise with the 5AC measure including English and maths. As this is 
so highly correlated with 5AC, we obtain very similar results. 
11 To obtain a complete picture of how schools with different characteristics perform according to the 
different PMs, we need to consider what happens when we allow all their characteristics to vary 
simultaneously in a multivariate setting. The results from doing so are not reported here but are 
available on request; they support the results illustrated in the Figures. 15 
                                                                                                                                            
12 Secondary school years are numbered 7 through 11; pupils take KS3 in Year 9 and GCSEs in Year 
11. So, for example, the indicator ‘Pupil joined school after September in Year 10’ means that the pupil 
joined the school less than two years before taking her GCSEs. 
13 These new schools are known as Academies, and have a non-government sponsor. See 
http://www.standards.dfes.gov.uk/academies/ for more details of the Academies programme. 
14 Full results available from the authors on request. 
15 Full results available from the authors on request. 
16 Details of the modelling framework used are available from the authors on request. 
17 Note that the other off-diagonal numbers may be driven by schools having small numbers of pupils; 
we return to this point later. 
18 Throughout this paper we rank schools across our sample, i.e. across the whole of England. An 
alternative would be to rank schools within their local authority (LA), weighted by pupil numbers (see 
Wilson (2004)). In fact the two methods of ranking produce highly correlated results.  
19 These are as calculated in the 2004 points system (see 
http://www.dfes.gov.uk/performancetables/nscoringsys.shtml). 
20 See, for example, the information available at 
http://www.standards.dfes.gov.uk/performance/1316367/CVAinPAT2005/?version=1  
21 This point arises from comments made by colleagues at the IPMN Workshop, Oxford, August 2007. 16 
   
*- significant at 10% 
**- significant at 5% 
 
 
Table 1: Pupil level CVA model 
 
  Effect  Mean  Min  Max 
Constant  92.15 
(11.82)** 
1  1  1 
KS2 fine grade average points score  -2.92 
(0.26)** 
26.74  15  36 
KS2english – KS2 average point score fine grades  2.58 
(0.07)** 
-0.57  -11.94  7.19 
KS2maths – KS2 average point score fine grades  0.54 
(0.07)** 
-0.12  -10.03  10.39 
Quadratic of KS2 Average Point Score  0.33 
(0.01)** 
730  225  1296 
Free school meal flag  -20.02 
(0.32)** 
0.12  0  1 
Income Deprivation Affecting Children Index score  -61.35 
(0.73)** 
0.21  0  0.99 
SEN action  -37.42 
(0.38)** 
0.08  0  1 
SEN action + statement  -56.14 
(0.48)** 
0.05  0  1 
Pupil joined school after September Year10  -68.54 
(0.88)** 
0.01  0  1 




0.04  0  1 
Female  16.42 
(0.21)** 
0.50  0  1 
Age in months  -1.13 
(0.03)** 
5.44  0  11 




0.08  0  1 
Black Caribbean  9.66 
(0.85)** 
0.01  0  1 
Black African  29.38 
(1.09)** 
0.01  0  1 
Black other  4.19 
(1.53)** 
0.00  0  1 
Indian  21.91 
(0.86)** 
0.02  0  1 
Pakistani  22.98 
(0.93)** 
0.02  0  1 
Bangladeshi  27.78 
(1.34)** 
0.01  0  1 
Asian  20.06 
(1.50)** 
0.00  0  1 
Chinese  28.76 
(1.74)** 
0.00  0  1 
Mixed White & Black Caribbean  -2.01 
(1.13)* 
0.01  0  1 
Mixed White & Black African  3.52 
(2.52) 
0.00  0  1 
Mixed White & Asian  11.78 
(1.53)** 
0.00  0  1 
Mixed Other  4.55 
(1.15)** 
0.01  0  1 
Other  23.39 
(1.34)** 
0.01  0  1 
Unclassified ethnic group  -13.14 
(0.59)** 
0.04  0  1 
KS2 average point score of cohort  2.85 
(0.33)** 
26.74  22.26  32.95 
KS2 standard deviation in cohort  -5.30 
(0.89)** 
3.53  0.91  5.07 
 
Varience between schools  305.78 
(8.86) 




Table 2a: Correlations between alternative PMs 
 
  5AC  5AC:EM  CVA 
5AC  1     
5AC:EM  0.93  1   
CVA  0.43  0.27  1 
 
 
Table 2b: Correlations between rankings based on alternative PMs 
 
  5AC  5AC:EM  CVA 
5AC  1     
5AC:EM  0.92  1   







Table 3: Correlations of school CVA performance across different sections of the 
ability distribution 
 
  low ability  medium ability  high ability 
low ability  1     
medium ability  0.85  1   




Table 4: Proportions of schools exhibiting large swings in CVA across years 
 
    2005 CVA  
  negative  average  positive 
negative  66.84%  30.77%  2.39% 
 











positive  3.60%  28.27%  68.13% 
 
Note: The figures are based on the percentage of schools with a particular 2004 
performance. For example: 66.84% of schools with significantly negative 
performance in 2004 have significantly negative performance in 2005. 
 
 
    2006 CVA  
  negative  average  positive 
negative  63.07%  34.14%  2.79% 
 











positive  2.28%  35.44%  62.28% 
 
Note: Figures based on the percentage of schools with a particular 2005 performance. 
 
 
    2006 CVA  
  negative  average  positive 
negative  60.08%  33.69%  6.22% 
 











positive  2.85%  38.99%  58.15% 
 
Note: Figures based on the percentage of schools with a particular 2004 performance 
as in the top panel 
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Table 5a: Correlations between CVA across years* 
 
  CVA 2004  CVA 2005  CVA 2006 
CVA 2004  1     
CVA 2005  0.74  1   




Table 5b: Correlations between CVA rankings across years* 
 
  CVA ranking 2004  CVA ranking 2005  CVA ranking 2006 
CVA ranking 2004  1     
CVA ranking 2005  0.72  1   
CVA ranking 2006  0.62  0.73  1 
 
 
*Note: these correlations are calculated for the 2,826 schools that are in our analysis 
sample for each of the three years. 
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Figure 6: Pairwise 95% confidence intervals 
 
 